One or Two Truths? Thirteenth-Century Jewish Averroism and Exegesis

One of the most famous accusations against Averroism is the leaning towards a “double truth theory”. Actually, the very idea of a “double truth” contradicts Ibn Rushd explicit statements in the Faṣl al-Maqāl, inviting to provide an allegorical interpretation (taʾwīl) of the Law whenever it contradicts reason. This rests undoubtedly on the axiom that a contradiction between Revelation and philosophy is not possible. Scholars tend to consider no one actually held “double truth” in the Latin world in the 13th century and that the accusation was a way to suggest that philosophers were religious hypocrites.

Turning to 13th century Jewish Averroists, in Provence and Northern Spain, sheds new light on the issue. While Ibn Rushd exhorted to reserve philosophical taʾwīl to a limited audience and Maimonides abandoned his project to write exegetical treatises for fear of disclosing hidden secrets, Averroists did not refrain from writing philosophical exegeses of the Bible and aggadot in order to express their philosophical ideas. It is striking though that contrary to Ibn Rushd, Jewish authors did not pretend to deliver the ultimate meaning of the interpreted texts and that, therefore, the role of exegesis cannot be limited to an apologetical accommodation of Torah and philosophy. We will explore the exegetical methods of Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Levi ben Avraham and Isaac Albalag and argue that the latter’s alleged “double truth theory” is the key to understand the specific role and practice of exegesis among Jewish Averroists, even those alleging the unity of the truth.