Mendelssohn and Spinoza on Immortality and the Substantiality of the Self

In his Morning Hours, Mendelssohn explains that his essential resistance to "purified" Spinozism is grounded in the "extra-divine substantiality" of the individual, which seems to be threatened by Spinoza`s radical pantheism. The continued substantiality of the self is, for Mendelssohn, a crucial component of the salvific truth of natural religion. It is therefore critical to him that death does not involve the annihilation of our distinct identities which must, in order to enable the felicity a providential God cannot but provide, remain substantial and real.

Mendelssohn first found literary fame as the "Socrates of Berlin" after the publication of his widely read Phaedon, which like Plato`s dialogue, argues for the immortality of the soul. This claim remained a central aspect of his philosopy ever after. Spinoza too, arguably somewhat unexpectedly, claims a form of immortality in chapter five of his Ethics, which has led several critics to dismiss the relevant propositions or even the chapter all together.

In this lecture, I will argue that Spinoza`s foray into the question of immortality is, like Mendelssohn`s, a deeply significant and integral part of his thinking. Furthermore, I will argue that contrasting Mendelssohn`s and Spinoza`s view of immortality, and reflecting on the way it relates to their differing position regarding the substantiality of the self, enables an insighftul comparative analysis of their respective philosophical and religious orientations.