The ACU/IPG Project: An International Super Consortium Eliminating the Security Risks Posed by Independent and Highly Vulnerable Middle East Nuclear Power Programs to Israel, the United States, Europe and Allied Arab States

Background
The highly-developed ACU/IPG project has been designed to minimize nuclear proliferation and security risks associated with the current and future development of civil nuclear power in the Middle East, while significantly increasing the national security of participating countries. The project gives Israel far greater reach and control than it now has over rapidly emerging nuclear power programs in the region.
We all recognize that Iran’s nuclear program poses an existential security threat to Israel as well as a major security risk to other states. If left unchecked, the expansion of civil nuclear power throughout the Middle East poses a comparable threat. At this time, four Arab countries are actively implementing nuclear power programs to build large reactors that will leave immense quantities of spent fuel in the region: UAE (4 reactors, the first coming on line this year); Egypt (4 reactors); Jordan (2 reactors); Saudi Arabia (16 reactors, with the first 2 reactors out for bid).
Each large power reactor will produce some 20 metric tons of spent fuel per year containing some 200 kilograms of weapon-usable plutonium. Failure to remove this spent nuclear fuel from the Middle East could lead to dire consequences for Israel, provides a strategic advantage to Iran, and creates a long-term trap for the United States. If 16 large power reactors are built in Saudi Arabia, these reactors would produce almost 200 metric tons of weapon-usable plutonium over their expected 60 year reactor lifetime – twice the amount of plutonium produced for nuclear weapons by the United States and more than that produced by the Soviet Union for nuclear weapons during the Cold War.
Moreover, the maturity of states that seek to build the reactors and will possess the plutonium is very much in doubt. Recent press reports of a Saudi threat to site a “nuclear waste dump” close to the Qatar border should act as a warning for the entire region.
The Alternative
A multi-superpower backed nuclear consortium (the “super consortium”) will build, operate, control and secure a fleet of interconnected regional reactors on behalf of IPG, a Middle East version of the Tennessee Valley Authority that is dedicated to regional economic transformation and security. IPG would be headquartered in the United States, where it is subject to U.S. law. and U.S. consent rights. The super consortium includes government-owned and private sector industrial enterprises from the United States, France, Britain, Russia and Israel. Equal stakeholders in IPG would be the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan and Israel (via ACU). All stakeholders that receive reactors will be required to sign 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreements under U.S. law.
The super consortium will supply fresh nuclear fuel from outside the region to reactors in the region – eliminating the claimed need for Middle East countries to acquire fuel enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing technologies. The project’s secure fuel in/spent fuel out system will ensure that spent fuel containing extractable weapon-usable plutonium, including reactor waste generated by the UAE nuclear reactor program, is removed from the region as it is produced.
The ample electricity generated by the IPG reactors will power extensive desalination, land reclamation and industrialization across the region. Israel will receive the full energy output of two reactors in Egypt without bearing any capital costs – helping Israel meet its goal of doubling electricity production by 2030 and allowing Israel to distribute significantly more electricity to the West Bank and Gaza to improve the lives of Palestinians.
The super consortium and the IPG construct provide Israel and the GCC states with an effective and durable means of blocking Iran’s ambitions to dominate the Middle East. The project will assert US, British, French and Israeli control over the numerous independent nuclear power programs now underway in the region that pose serious risks of weapon proliferation, heading off a nuclear arms race. It will strengthen regional security through a high-level security package, preferably supplied by Israel, including space, cyber and physical security systems – generating reliable and strategically valuable revenues for Israel.
Why Nuclear
The project’s security benefits to Israel and the Gulf Arab states as well as the substantial economic benefits to the region cannot be secured by a small nuclear project. Equally important, a large non-nuclear project cannot secure the needed nonproliferation benefits. A large-scale regional nuclear construction and operating project, with its substantial economic returns to the consortium members, is the only means of cementing the super consortium’s commitment to the economic transformation of the region. The project must be economically important enough for the consortium members collectively to ensure the project’s completion and success. The security required to ensure safe operation of the reactor fleet forces far greater cooperation than is otherwise possible between the IPG stakeholders and super consortium members in support of the project’s critical mission.
Conclusion
Israel faces a daunting existential threat if nuclear power development in the Middle East continues unchecked. The ACU/IPG project provides a viable alternative to independent rapidly emerging nuclear power programs that put the security and stability of the region at great risk. The ACU/IPG project requires the participation, blessing and support of Israel.