The Future of Nuclear Power as an Issue of Risk Perception and Risk Communication

Since electricity was first produced in a nuclear power plant on a commercial scale in 1956, an experience of over 17,000 reactor-years of operation has accumulated. Nuclear energy now provides 11% of the global electricity generation from about 450 power reactors, and allows to avoid significant greenhouse gas emissions from combustion of fossil fuels.
The need to produce more electricity (a doubling in demand is predicted until 2040) and simultaneously reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, together with the intrinsic limitations of renewables to produce the bulk of baseload power, are strong incentives in favor of the development of nuclear power. Paradoxically, the share of nuclear power in electricity production has fallen from 16% during the 1990s and the 2000s to 11% today.
It is argued that perception by the public of the risks and benefits associated with nuclear power is a key element in predicting its future. Although the safety record of nuclear energy is good and it is a safer way to generate electricity than most other energy sources, three major accidents involving a (partial or full) core meltdown of a reactor in a nuclear power plant occurred during this period: Three Mile Island (TMI), USA (1979), Chernobyl, Ukraine (1986) and Fukushima, Japan (2011). It will be shown how those major accidents hindered the development of nuclear power.
TMI was the first instance of a core meltdown in a nuclear power plant. Although the containment building remained intact and virtually no radioactive material was released to the environment, the accident caused a sharp decline in public confidence in nuclear energy and brought the development of nuclear power to a halt in the USA. It was a major cause of the decline in nuclear construction through the 1980s and 1990s.
The Chernobyl accident was the worst accident imaginable with regard to release of radioactive material to the environment. Paradoxically, its impact on the nuclear industry was moderate: although decisions were made to phase out nuclear power in Germany and Sweden, they were not implemented. It looked as if the particular circumstances of the accident (unique and flawed reactor design, absence of containment building, lack of safety culture) made it of little relevance to the rest of the nuclear industry. By the middle of the 2000s, it looked as if a nuclear renaissance was under way.
Consequences of the Fukushima accident for the future of nuclear energy were more serious. In Japan, 7 years after the accident, most nuclear power plants are still not operating due to strong public opposition and the nuclear share of electricity generation is about 4%, down from 30% before the accident. In Germany, where a second decision to phase out nuclear power is gradually implemented, the nuclear share is down from 28% to 12%.
Risk perception of nuclear power by the public highlights concerns about safety, but also nuclear waste management and to a lesser extent nuclear proliferation.
Risk communication is defined as exchange of information and opinions, and establishment of an effective dialogue, among those responsible for assessing, minimizing, and regulating risks and those who may be affected by the outcomes of those risks. It is concluded that unless an effective risk communication is established with regard to nuclear energy, forecasting its role in the global energy mix may lead to unwarranted results.