Dr. Ehud (Udi) Golan
Commitment Problems and The Israeli Palestinian Conflict
The proposed research aims to examine the influence of commitment problems during key stages of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the years 1993-2015.
The commitment problem theory claims that even when two sides in a conflict (the government and the rebels in case of a civil war) have an interest in ending a war and may even reach an agreement, one actor fears that the other actor will not implement the agreement or will exploit a future change of conditions to renege on a settlement.
The commitment problem has been identified as a major strategic obstacle to negotiated settlement in internal conflicts. Previous research literature have used game theory models to present the commitment problem and tested it in cases of civil wars and ethnic conflicts.
The primary theoretical innovation of the proposed research is development of the commitment problem concept. By employing a neoclassical realist approach it aims to show how both structural materiel factors (geography, military capabilities) and the political-military leadership perceptions shape commitment problems and the actor`s policy response to them. Using the commitment problem to analyze the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will provide new insights and policy relevant lessons.
The Research Method is Structured Focused Comparison of six key periods/sub cases: a.The beginning of the Oslo process 1993-1995 b.Netnayahu`s first term 1996-1999 c. The Camp David Negotiations 2000 d. The road map and the disengagement plan 2003-2005. e. The Annapolis process f. Netanyahu and the Kerry negotiations.