“Only an Act is Effective While a Thought is of No Consequence”: The Shoteh as an Extreme Case for the Attribution of Acts and Application of Laws

“Only an act is effective while a thought is of no consequence”: The shoteh as an extreme case for acts attribution and Law applicability

It is typical for the Talmud to bring extreme cases through which it is possible to examine fundamental legal issues. Through the case of the shoteh [madman] - as an extreme case of people for whom “only an act is effective while a thought is of no consequence” (Mishnah, Tractate Taharot 8:6), or who “lacks mental competence [da’at]” (Mishnah, Tractate Arakhin 1:1) - different questions can be examined, most of them concerning the problematics of the attribution of an act to the person who performs it. Determining whether a legal act which requires human action (ex. marriage, divorce, commercial trades, separation of the tithes, etc.) has indeed been performed or not depends on this kind of attribution. In the field of nezikin [damages], responsibility for acts appears also as a function of this kind of attribution.

However, in the beginning of the tractate of Chagigah (TB Chagigah 2b), following the Mishnah’s statement “All are obligated in the commandment of appearance [reiyiah], except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor”, the Talmud discusses a slightly different point, namely the possibility to impose an obligation on a shoteh.

In talmudic discussions concerning the possibilities of attribution of an act to a person, through the extreme case of the shoteh, it is possible to investigate what the limits of an act are. Here, however, what seems to be in question are the limits of the law itself. What are the limits for the applicability of the law? Are there cases who are, systematically or circumstantially, excluded from the domain of applicability of the law?