Principles of research practices not only engender epistemic ideals but also ethical virtues. This argument finds support when it comes to virtues such as academic freedom, honesty, transparency, but equally applies to a concept such as objectivity that not only has a methodological but also a moral meaning. It is argued that the works of cross-cultural, cultural, indigenous, and postcolonial psychology, as well as intellectual movements to decolonize the project of psychology, evidence not only the temporal and cultural dimensions of the discipline and profession, but also implicate expanding the canon of epistemic values. It is suggested that epistemic humility (EH) is a virtue that emerges from these endeavors. EH is required in all psychological knowledge claims, but because Western psychology is dominant, North American projects are required to embrace this idea. Yet, the value of EH conflicts with actual neoliberal research practices, where advertising, selling, and the impact of research are measured and used as benchmarks for success and promotion processes. This tension creates an important contradiction where the epistemic reality of the limits of psychological research are superseded by entrepreneurial criteria of success. Reconstructing the history of epistemic humility on the background of cultural psychologies, core features of EH are discussed. Implications of EH in the contexts of scientific discovery, justification, interpretation, and application are presented, using examples from the discipline and practice of psychology in order to decolonize psychology.